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Abstract
Against the backdrop of increasing calls for mandatory and voluntary climate-related disclosures by companies, this article provides 
insight into how the (integrated) annual reports of companies listed on the AEX index in the Netherlands, communicated companies’ 
engagement with climate issues from 2016 to 2018. Drawing on research in the cognitive psychology domain, the article examines 
companies’ reported attention to climate change as well as their climate-related actions. It shows that although there are noticeable 
climate attention and action differences among AEX companies, over time the companies as a whole have started doing more in 
relation to climate – for example, in terms of attention, there is increase in the inclusion of climate considerations in strategy making 
and, in terms of action, there is increase in the inclusion of climate in material risks. The article discusses the research findings, 
which have implications for effective governance by corporate boards.
Relevance to practice
This article shows that the engagement of AEX companies with climate issues has increased since 2016. Still, there remains more 
to be done in terms of attention to climate change and the taking of climate-related actions, as well as reporting to shareholders and 
stakeholders. While the article is based on the (integrated) annual reports of AEX companies, its common message for all firms 
is that the need for addressing the potential risks and opportunities arising from climate change and for clearly communicating a 
company’s climate actions is too important and urgent to be left unattended. The article underscores the important role that non-ex-
ecutive directors on (supervisory) boards can play in this regard.
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1. Introduction
As a new decennium starts, academic and public consen-
sus continues to shift towards the view that the pursuit of 
profits and social goals by business corporations need not 
imply the pursuit of either opposing or mutually exclusive 
ends (Eccles et al. 2014; Porter and Kramer 2011). There 
is thus greater incentive for companies, as well as greater 
pressure on them from governments, investors, lenders, 
insurers and other stakeholders to invest more in setting 
and achieving social goals in addition to financial ones 
(Kamp-Roelands et al. 2019; Reid and Toffel 2009). In 
this context, the calls for voluntary as well as mandatory 
reporting of corporate engagement with environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues have grown in the 
last ten years. Such reporting is expected to facilitate not 
only informed investment decisions in corporate stocks 
and bonds by socially oriented investors, but also allow 
other categories of stakeholders to evaluate whether they 
wish to associate with a company based on its ESG per-
formance (Bebbington et al. 2008; Plumlee et al. 2015).
At present, several financial-market organizations com-
pile and disseminate companies’ ESG-related ratings. Thus, 
interested parties can turn to, for instance, the Bloomberg 
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ESG data, the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and the 
FTSE4Good Index. A concern with such ratings as well 
as self-disclosures by companies is that in the absence of 
clear regulations and universal standards, companies’ ESG 
scores entail subjectivity and are not easily verifiable and 
comparable across firms and industries (e.g., Stubbs and 
Rogers 2013). With regard to environment-related scores 
in particular, to enable availability of consistent, compa-
rable data, several frameworks and guidelines have been 
proposed by, among others, CDP (formerly, Carbon Dis-
closure Project), the Climate Disclosure Standards Board 
(CDSB), the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 
(SASB) and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD). The CDSB and TCFD guidelines 
seek to encourage lucid self-disclosures in mainstream cor-
porate reports, such that, a company’s impact on climate, 
the climate-related risks and opportunities the company 
faces, and the company’s efforts to promote sustainability 
are communicated transparently to stakeholders.
With the above as background, this article examines 
how the corporate reports of publicly listed companies 
on the AEX index in the Netherlands communicated or 
reported their engagement with climate issues in the three-
year period from 2016 to 2018. Because the AEX index 
includes companies whose shares are most frequently 
traded on the stock exchange, the companies on the index 
have strong incentive and face strong stakeholder pres-
sure to address climate concerns (e.g., Flammer 2013). 
Furthermore, the 2016–2018 period is an interesting one 
to study because of the greater sense of urgency created 
to tackle climate concerns by several developments, such 
as, the 2015 Paris Agreement signed by the governments 
of 195 countries to limit global warming to under 2 °C. 
More recently, in 2017, the EU’s Non-Financial Report-
ing Directive (NFRD) came into effect in the Netherlands, 
making inclusion of non-financial information in annual 
reports compulsory, covering periods starting on or after 
1 January 2017. Furthermore, in 2019, the EU announced 
its non-binding guidelines on reporting climate-related in-
formation. Regulators in several EU countries have shown 
support for the guidelines and indicated that they will en-
force compliance with them. These developments have 
increased pressure on companies to publicly disclose both 
the impact of their business activities on climate and the 
climate-related policies they have put in place.
Our analysis reveals variation across companies in 
terms of the attention they paid to climate and the con-
crete actions they took to deal with climate-related issues. 
Furthermore, our analysis also shows an attention-action 
correspondence – companies that paid less attention to 
the climate factor were also the ones that took less ac-
tions to tackle climate concerns. In addition, the analysis 
indicates some change over time in individual companies’ 
engagement with climate-related issues. We start below, 
in Section 2, by outlining the research background. Sec-
tion 3 describes the research methodology in terms of the 
corporate reports that were examined, and the indicators 
that were used to measure companies’ attention to climate 
and companies’ climate-related actions. Section 4 reports 
and discusses the study’s findings. Section 5 presents a 
concluding discussion centering on the implications of 
the study’s findings for practitioners and researchers; the 
section also offers suggestions for future research.
2. Research background
Contrary to Friedman’s (1970) classic thesis that society is 
best served when the focus of business corporations is on 
increasing shareholder value and not on social responsibi-
lities, academic research increasingly indicates that compa-
nies may, in fact, be able to improve their financial perfor-
mance and create more shareholder value while pursuing 
social-responsibility goals (Ioannou and Serafeim 2015; Or-
tiz‐de‐Mandojana and Bansal 2016). Indeed, in the current 
socio-political context, profit-focused companies that dis-
regard environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues 
run the risk of eroding their competitive position by losing 
social legitimacy and alienating stakeholders (Beck et al. 
2017; Flammer 2013). Although companies apparently can 
expect to benefit from pursuing social goals, there is much 
variation in the emphasis on realization of such goals across 
firms in different industries, sectors and nations. (BCG Re-
port 2017; KPMG et al. 2018).
In relation to climate-related social goals, for example, 
companies differ with respect to voluntarily reporting their 
engagement with climate-related concerns, suggesting 
differences in whether climate goals are pursued. The in-
centive and pressure on companies to communicate their 
focus on climate issues to stakeholders has, however, in-
creased vastly in the last decade as public concern about 
global warming and sustainability has grown. In this re-
gard, the 2015 Paris Agreement, the inclusion of “climate 
action” as one of the U.N.’s SDGs, the 2014 EU's Non-Fi-
nancial Reporting Directive that came into effect in the 
Netherlands in 2017, information demands from investors 
and other stakeholders, and efforts by governmental and 
private institutes and organizations to provide recommen-
dations and tools that facilitate climate-related disclosures 
are important developments that are pressing companies 
harder to engage with climate issues.
The attention-action framework constitutes a useful 
template for documenting companies’ engagement with 
climate issues. Attention is an important psychological con-
struct, which captures the cognitive processes of noticing 
and interpreting specific environmental cues and devoting 
time and effort to acquiring information related to them 
(Kahneman 1973; Ocasio 1997). Whether and to what ex-
tent a company’s attention is directed to cues concerning 
the impact its business has on climate, the risks and oppor-
tunities posed by climate change, and formulation of cli-
mate goals is dependent on the company’s corporate lead-
ership. A company’s CEO, top management team (TMT) of 
senior-most executives, and non-executive board directors 
(NEDs) can be expected to have most influence on compa-
ny’s attention focus by virtue of being the decision-making 
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group with most responsibility and power for charting the 
company’s strategic course (Hambrick and Mason 1984; 
Kor 2006; Westphal and Fredrickson 2001). It is however 
the case that because NEDs are not directly involved in the 
day-to-day operations of a company, their influence might 
be constrained by information asymmetry. For instance, al-
though NEDs have a fiduciary duty to ensure that a firm 
addresses material risks and opportunities associated with 
climate change, they may not have enough pertinent infor-
mation to offer proper counsel and guidance.
The attention focus of corporate leaders is postulated 
to be the precursor of action (Li et al. 2013; Shepherd et 
al. 2017). Research shows, for example, that CEO atten-
tion to an emerging technology is associated with faster 
entry into a new market (Eggers and Kaplan 2009) and 
that TMT’s attention change is a precondition for change 
in strategy (Cho and Hambrick 2006). However, the level 
of attention to an issue may not always be commensurate 
with actions taken to address that issue. For instance, a 
company may not have the requisite resources to take ac-
tions to mitigate risks and exploit opportunities related to 
climate (cf. Nadkarni and Chen 2014). In addition, the at-
tention evident to climate in a company’s vision and other 
rhetoric may not find expression in actual climate-related 
actions due to decoupling of legitimacy-enhancing cor-
porate intent from actual practices (Weaver et al. 1999). 
Thus, while attention to climate in corporate reports may 
indicate awareness or recognition of climate as a pressing 
social issue by corporate leaders, action represents a more 
concrete expression of organizational commitment to ad-
dressing climate concerns. In research on communication 
of corporate social responsibility, the gap between atten-
tion and action is captured by the idiom “not walking the 
talk” (Crane and Glozer 2016).
This study employs the attention-action framework 
to examine how publicly listed companies in the Neth-
erlands communicate their engagement with climate is-
sues in corporate reports. In particular, we map the atten-
tion paid to climate issues as well as the climate-related 
actions taken by the companies. The mapping exercise 
seeks to establish whether there are differences among 
companies in their attention and actions, and how com-
panies’ attention and actions changed over the three-year 
period from 2016 to 2018. Such a descriptive account of 
companies’ engagement with climate issues constitutes 
an important first step towards developing better schol-
arly understanding of how and why companies’ respond 
differently to incentives and pressures for more corporate 
social responsibility. It can also provide important prac-
tical insights for companies, which enable the effective 
balancing of shareholder expectations regarding financial 
performance with stakeholder expectations regarding cli-
mate-related social performance.
3. Research methodology
For the attention-action mapping, we focused on the 25 
companies that were on the AEX listing in November 
2019. As one of these companies was not listed on the 
AEX in 2016 and 2017, for these two years our sample 
comprised 24 companies. We obtained our data primarily 
from the companies’ annual reports for 2016, 2017 and 
2018. In addition, whenever an annual report referred to the 
annual sustainability report or an integrated annual report 
was available, we also examined the latter reports to assess 
company’s engagement with climate issues. We employed 
a set of eight items to gauge companies’ attention to climate 
and another set of eight items to gauge their climate actions. 
In particular, we systematically and diligently inspected all 
annual, integrated and sustainability reports to determine 
companies’ annual score vis-à-vis each item. Specifically, 
with regard to each item, we instructed two trained rese-
arch assistants to independently go through all reports, 
and extract and record all relevant text having bearing on 
an item. The assistants focused on text that was explicitly 
about climate change and ignored text that was only indi-
rectly linked to climate change through a reference to, say, 
sustainability, or the usage of other common terms such as 
"ecological", "environmental" and "green". The assistants 
also noted down the page numbers on which extracted tex-
tual material appeared in the reports. After this, one of the 
paper’s co-authors cross-checked whether there was clear 
correspondence between the textual material extracted by 
the assistants and the focal items. Any instances of doubtful 
correspondence were resolved through a discussion with 
the assistants and by examining texts in their context, i.e., 
by reading the texts in the reports they were extracted from. 
After this, we used the extracted textual material to assign 
scores to companies for each item for each year. Table 1 
shows the sixteen items, the scoring scheme per item, and 
the number of companies that had a specific score per year. 
We summed up companies’ individual scores on the atten-
tion and action items to arrive respectively at their annual 
attention to climate and climate action scores, which could 
range from 0 to 12. These scores and the changes therein 
from 2016 to 2018 are shown in Table 2.
4. Analysis and findings
Looking at Table 1 first, one notes a general increase 
over time in the number of companies receiving higher 
scores on both the attention to climate and climate ac-
tion items. Thus, from 2016 to 2018, the number of 
companies scoring “0” decreased, while the number of 
companies scoring either “1” or “2” increased. In rela-
tion to some items, though, there was a sharper increase 
in the percentage of companies that scored higher. For 
example, whereas in 2016 only 12 companies (50% of 
the sample) had made a reference to “climate” in their 
strategy, by 2018 the number had increased to 21 com-
panies (88% of the sample). As another example, there 
was a sharp increase in the number of companies that had 
either quantified or qualified risks and opportunities con-
nected to climate change – from 13 companies (54% of 
the sample) in 2016 to 19 companies (76% of the sample) 
in 2018. These examples illustrate that more companies 
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seem to be giving thought to climate issues when deve-
loping their strategy and business model. Furthermore, 
there seems to be an increasing sense of urgency on the 
part of companies to act. Whereas in 2016 only 11 com-
panies (45% of the sample) had explicitly mentioned this 
urgency, in 2018 the number had increased to 16 (64% of 
the sample). In addition, while in 2016 only 11 compa-
nies (46% of the sample) had included climate change in 
material risks, by 2018 the number had increased to 16 
companies (64% of the sample).
Turning to Table 2, we see that the attention to climate 
scores of 16 companies increased (64% of the sample) 
between 2016 and 2018, of 5 companies remained un-
changed, and of 3 companies decreased. Regarding cli-
mate action scores, those of 18 companies (72% of the 
sample) increased. Of these 18 companies, the scores 
of three companies – ABN AMRO, IMCD and Vopak – 
increased appreciably. Furthermore, the climate action 
scores of three companies remained unchanged, while 
there was a decrease in the score of one company. Over-
all, Akzo Nobel is the only company whose attention and 
action scores both decreased between 2016 and 2018. 
We used companies’ annual climate attention and action 
scores to plot the companies on two-dimensional graphs. 
Figure 1 shows the attention-action graph for the year 
2016. The midpoints on the graph’s x and y axis were 
used to divide the graph into four quadrants. Looking at 
the graph, 10 companies in the sample (i.e., 42%) appear 
in the first quadrant reflecting low climate attention and 
low climate action. In addition, 7 companies in the sample 
(i.e., 29%) are in the third quadrant reflecting high climate 
Table 1. Climate attention and action items, scoring schemes, 
and number of scoring companies per year.
Items Scoring scheme Number of 
companies
A. Climate attention 2016 2017 2018
1. There is reference to 
‘climate’ in company’s 
mission statement
Yes=2 0 0 0
Reference to 
sustainability, but not 
to climate specifically 
=1
3 6 5
No=0 21 18 20
2. There is reference to 
‘climate’ in CEO’s letter 
to shareholders
Yes=1 8 12 11
No=0 16 12 14
3. SDG 13 is prioritised 
relative to other SDGs
Yes=2 5 9 9
A little=1 2 4 3
No=0 17 11 13
4. There is reference 
to ‘climate’ in the 
company’s strategy
Explicitly=2 12 15 21
Implicitly=1 2 1 0
No=0 10 8 4
5. There is reference to 
‘climate’ in the report of 
the supervisory board
Yes=1 5 5 9
No=0 19 19 16
6. Risk/opportunity is 
quantified or qualified
Yes=1 13 16 19
No=0 11 8 6
7. Urgency to take action 
is evident
Explicitly=2 11 12 16
Implicitly=1 3 1 1
No=0 10 11 8
8. Costs of CO2 emissions 
is mentioned and 
quantified
Yes=1 4 5 5
No=0 20 19 20
B. Climate action
1. Climate and/or CO2 
are used for bonus/award 
schemes
Yes=1 2 6 6
No=0 22 18 19
2. Steps to address 
climate change initiated
Several steps taken=2 15 17 21
A step taken=1 4 5 3
No steps taken=0 5 2 1
3. Climate targets exist 
and are monitored
Quantitative=2 16 16 17
Qualitative=1 4 6 7
No=0 4 2 1
4. There are requirements 
for suppliers regarding 
climate/CO2
Yes=1 5 8 9
No=0 19 16 16
5. Low-carbon products/
services are offered
Yes=1 14 12 14
No=0 10 12 11
6. Company includes 
climate change in 
material risks 
Yes=1 11 13 16
No=0 13 11 9
7. Carbon emissions are 
reported
Scope 1, 2 & 3 = 2 11 11 15
Scope 1&2 = 1 9 9 6




There is a TCFD 
report=2
0 3 7
Intention to use 
TCFD=1
3 7 6
No engagement with 
TCFD=0
21 14 12
Table 2. Yearly climate attention and action scores and changes 
over time.
Climate action scores Climate attention scores
Company / 
YEAR
2016 2017 2018 Change 
2016–
2018
2016 2017 2018 Change 
2016–
2018
Aalberts Ind. 2 4 6 4 0 3 4 4
ABN AMRO 3 7 8 5 0 7 8 8
Adyen n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 n.a.
Aegon 5 7 7 2 1 2 7 6
Ahold Delhaize 7 7 9 2 5 4 8 3
Akzo Nobel 9 9 8 -1 9 8 5 -4
ArcelorMittal 8 8 8 0 4 8 10 6
ASML 4 4 7 3 1 3 5 4
ASR Nederland 7 9 9 2 4 7 8 4
DSM 10 10 11 1 11 11 10 -1
Galapagos 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
Heineken 7 8 9 2 6 8 6 0
IMCD 0 2 5 5 0 0 2 2
ING Group 9 11 11 2 5 6 7 2
KPN 8 8 9 1 8 3 7 -1
NN Group 7 8 9 2 3 4 6 3
Philips 8 9 11 3 7 6 10 3
Randstad 
Holding
5 5 5 0 0 1 2 2
RELX Group 6 6 8 2 5 3 5 0
Royal Dutch 
Shell
6 8 8 2 7 10 10 3
Takeawaycom 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 0
Unibail-
Rodamco
9 9 10 1 5 4 5 0
Unilever 8 9 11 3 8 11 10 2
Vopak 3 6 8 5 5 7 6 1
Wolters Kluwer 5 5 5 0 2 6 4 2
Total Score 136 160 187 96 122 145
Average 
Score*
5,67 6,67 7,48 4,00 5,08 5,80
Companies with decrease in score 1 3
Companies with no change in 
score
3 5
Companies with increase in score 18 16
* Average score = Total score / total number of companies with published reports
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Figure 2. Year 2018 attention-action mapping.
Figure 1. Year 2016 attention-action mapping.
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attention as well as high climate action. In line with the 
literature, thus, our mapping indicates considerable cor-
respondence between attention and action (Li et al. 2013; 
Shepherd et al. 2017), suggesting greater climate attention 
to be an antecedent of climate action. Notably, though, 
7 companies in the sample (i.e., 29%) are in the second 
quadrant, having scored relatively low on climate atten-
tion but high on climate action. This suggests that some 
companies may not be communicating or reporting their 
attention to climate in enough detail (the attention scores 
in this quadrant were in the lower half of the 12-point 
range) even though they are taking climate actions.
Figure 2 shows the attention-action graph for the year 
2018. Relative to the year 2016, the number of companies 
in the first quadrant decreased to 6 (i.e., 24%) in 2018. The 
decrease is due to either an upward or a rightward move on 
the graph by companies. The change implies an increase 
in climate attention and climate action over the 2016–2018 
period by AEX companies as a set. Accordingly, the num-
ber of companies in the third quadrant, which reflects high 
climate attention as well as high climate action, is 14 (i.e., 
56%) in 2018. Furthermore, 5 companies in the sample (i.e., 
20%) are in the second quadrant, having scored relatively 
low on climate attention but high on climate action. Inter-
estingly, the three companies that have the lowest climate 
attention and climate action scores are companies that have 
been the shortest on the AEX listing. This suggests that the 
public scrutiny that an AEX listing brings may put pressure 
on companies and incentivize them to engage more with 
the issue of climate (see also Ioannou and Serafeim 2015; 
Flammer 2013). Overall, then, we find cross-sectional var-
iation across firms in their climate attention and climate 
action scores. We also find some increase in both climate 
attention and climate action scores over time.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Watershed events such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and 
the E.U. non-financial reporting directive have added a 
sense of urgency to the calls for voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure of companies’ engagement with climate issues 
connected to their business. In this context, the present 
study examines the corporate reports of publicly listed 
companies in the Netherlands to document their attenti-
on to climate issues from 2016 to 2018 and the climate 
actions they took. The attention-action mapping exerci-
se we present is new to the literature on climate-related 
reporting. Our analysis shows that the companies in our 
sample differ in terms of their climate attention and cli-
mate actions, and that more attention is related generally 
to more action. The analysis also reveals considerable dif-
ferences in attention and action across firms. Considering 
that all firms in our sample are large in terms of market 
capitalization, are traded frequently, and are subject to 
similar public scrutiny and stakeholder pressures, the dif-
ferences in their attention and actions presumably reflect 
differences in industry, firm and intra-firm factors.
Interestingly, referring to the difference between cli-
mate attention and climate action scores that underlie 
the mapping shown in Figure 2, Arcelor Mittal and Shell 
stand out as companies that are among the highest scor-
ing on the climate attention aspect. They however trail 
others in terms of climate action. A plausible explanation 
for this may be that the challenge for both companies to 
take action is outsized given the nature of their business. 
More climate action is probably still to follow for both 
companies. It may also be that the two may not be com-
municating their climate actions fully in their corporate 
reports. Furthermore, Figure 2 points to Aalberts Ind., 
Akzo Nobel, ASML, RELX group, and Unibail-Rodam-
co-Westfield as companies whose climate action scores 
are higher than their climate attention scores. Inspection 
of data indicates that, except for Akzo Nobel, this can be 
ascribed to climate not having been included explicitly 
in these companies’ policy and strategy making (for ex-
ample, climate discussions may not have featured on the 
boards’ agendas). A potential hazard of such an approach 
is that climate actions may have an impromptu character 
(Maas et al. 2016). The noted companies would therefore 
be well advised to give attention to climate in their policy 
and strategy formulation, so that, a coherent set of climate 
actions follows. Maas et al. (2016) suggest, for example, 
an integrative approach that weaves sustainability issues 
into the firm’s vision and strategy.
In addition, AEX firms’ climate attention and climate 
action scores mostly increased between 2016 and 2018. 
This is consistent with the more intense pressure on firms 
to engage with climate issues and to share publicly the 
climate actions they have taken. A look at individual in-
dicators of climate attention in 2018 reveals that in terms 
of external communication, climate issues were explicit-
ly mentioned in the CEO letters-to-shareholders of only 
11 AEX firms (i.e., 44%). Many CEOs, thus, still do not 
give much attention to climate when communicating 
with shareholders and potential investors. However, by 
2018, 21 AEX firms (i.e., 88%) had paid some attention 
to climate change in the context of strategy formulation. 
In all but one case, companies also reported steps to 
reduce carbon emissions, plausibly reflecting an atten-
tion-action dynamic. In a similar vein, attention to cli-
mate as a material risk was always associated with goals 
(quantitative or qualitative) and steps to combat climate 
change. Surprisingly, climate was included on the agenda 
of non-executive directors (NEDs) on supervisory boards 
of only 9 AEX firms (i.e., 36%). This suggests that CEOs 
and executive directors seem to pay more attention to cli-
mate than NEDs, even though the latter supposedly have 
a major role to play in this regard.
On the whole, our investigation indicates that atten-
tion to climate and climate-related actions are on the rise 
among AEX companies. Moreover, inasmuch as greater 
climate action follows greater climate attention, the in-
crease in attention in the last years can be expected to 
lead to more action in the future. This said, one message 
to come from this study for corporate leaders is that firms 
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can do much more in terms of engaging with climate than 
they seem to do currently. For example, we did not find 
across the board evidence for a comprehensive approach 
to climate-related risk management. In a context in which 
the Dutch Central Bank (Preesman 2019) has started con-
ducting climate stress tests on Dutch financial institutions, 
companies would do good to include climate in their risk 
management efforts. Otherwise, companies run the risk 
of being left with stranded assets, just like Uniper MPP3 
(formerly EON) was when it had to close its innovative 
coal powered electricity plant. Moreover, unprepared 
companies may face physical risks (for example, because 
of rising sea levels or changes in weather patterns), legal 
risks due to lawsuits, market risks on account of shift in 
customer preferences, and cost base risks because of ex-
tra expenditures and investments to cope with the effects 
of climate change. With regard to climate risks specifi-
cally, but also more generally, this study indicates some-
what limited involvement of firms’ supervisory boards 
with climate issues. Climate was seemingly on the NEDs’ 
agenda only in roughly one-third of the companies.
An additional message to come from our study there-
fore is that companies should seek a greater engagement 
of NEDs with climate issues. The involvement of NEDs 
is likely to enhance attention to climate, because strategy 
discussions become richer with the availability of a more 
diverse range of perspectives and suggestions (e.g., Bos-
boom et al. 2019; Sidhu et al. 2020). This, in turn, is likely 
to have a positive impact on climate actions. It is worth 
underlining in this context that NEDs have a fiduciary ob-
ligation towards shareholders and stakeholders to monitor 
the executive function’s efforts to address climate issues 
and to communicate them externally. Indeed, NEDs may, 
whenever necessary, consider taking the lead in asking the 
executive management about attention to climate and how 
a firm’s mission and strategy take the climate into account. 
NEDs can act as sparring partners of executives confronted 
with climate dilemmas and offer their advice and counsel.
As any other piece of research, our descriptive account 
of AEX firms also has limitations. One limitation of our 
study is that it focused only on large firms. As a result, 
we do not know how medium-sized and smaller firms’ 
attention to climate and climate actions compare to those 
of larger firms.
Future work could thus seek to expand our study by 
examining a broader sample of firms. In addition, the 
scope of this study did not allow us to examine inter and 
intra-industry differences in attention and action, and the 
reasons for these. Future work in this direction would 
be of much value. Furthermore, our analysis was based 
on climate information reported in corporate reports. It 
would be interesting to know in the future how disclo-
sures in corporate reports tally with companies’ mandato-
ry climate reporting.
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